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Extended Abstract
Research partnerships between innovating firms have attracted great politi-
cal and academic attention during the past decade. Investigating this phe-
nomenon, the focus of interest in the theoretical as well as in the empirical
literature has generally been on formal arrangements of R&D cooperation such
as research joint ventures, informal cooperation modes have not been consid-
ered so far.
Using data from the first and second waves of the Mannheim Innovation
Panel (MIP) we investigate which factors influence firms’ propensity to engage
into innovation cooperations with customers and suppliers.
The data-set makes evident that the number of firms that engage into in-
formal cooperation for innovation is larger and informal cooperation is per-
ceived as more important. On the basis of multinomial logit regressions, we
obtain the following results. A firm’s ability to protect its proprietary innova-
tions by protection mechanisms (appropriability), like secrecy, complexity and
lead time, tends to increase the probability of cooperating with vertically re-
lated firms. In contrast, our estimation results do not provide much empirical
evidence in support to the hypothesis that (incoming) spillovers between ver-
tically related firms do have a positive impact on firms’ decision to cooperate.
This extends the findings of previous work to informal cooperation. Moreover,
we find that firms in industries with an intense development of new products
and new markets (innovation dynamics) have a higher probability of coop-
erating formally and informally with customers and suppliers. Furthermore,
firms that engage continuously in R&D, hence firms with a larger absorptive
capacity, engage into cooperation with higher probability. Firms who operate
an R&D department and firms who are involved in costly R&D projects tend
to cooperate formally rather than informally.
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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Innovationskooperationen zwischen innovativen Firmen haben in der ju¨ngeren
Vergangenheit starke Aufmerksamkeit auf akademischer und politischer Ebene
hervorgerufen. Dabei lag der Interessensschwerpunkt in der Regel auf formellen
Typen von Innovationskooperationen, wie z.B. Forschungs Joint Ventures, in-
formelle Kooperationsarten fanden in der Regel keine Beachtung.
Auf der Basis der ersten und zweiten Welle des Mannheimer Innovations
Panel (MIP) untersuchen wir, welche Faktoren die Neigung von Firmen beein-
flussen, Innovationskooperationen mit Kunden bzw. Zulieferern einzugehen.
Zuna¨chst wird bei dem Datensatz deutlich, dass eine ho¨here Zahl von Fir-
men informelle Innovationskooperationen eingehen, gleichzeitig messen sie
diesen Kooperationsformen ho¨here Bedeutung bei. Auf der Basis von multino-
mialen Logit Regressionen erzielen wir die folgenden Ergebnisse. Firmen, die
in der Lage sind ihre Innovationen durch Schutzmechanismen oder -strategien
(wie Komplexita¨t der Technologie oder Geheimhaltung) vor schneller Imita-
tion zu bewahren sind eher bereit Kooperationen einzugehen. (Empfangene)
Wissenspillover haben keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Kooperationsnei-
gung, wobei dies sowohl fu¨r formelle als auch (wie hier erstmals gezeigt wer-
den konnte) fu¨r informelle Kooperationsformen gilt. Firmen, die sich in einer
Branche mit einem hohen Anteil an neuen Produkten oder auf neuen Ma¨rkten
beta¨tigen kooperieren mit ho¨herer Wahrscheinlichkeit sowohl formell als auch
informell. Firmen, die dauerhaft FuE betreiben, also Firmen mit ho¨herer Ab-
sorptionskapazita¨t, kooperieren mit ho¨herer Wahrscheinlichkeit. Firmen, die
eine Forschungsabteilung betreiben und Firmen, die kostenintensive Forschungs-
projekte betreiben, kooperieren eher formell und nicht ausschließlich informell.
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Abstract
Based on a sample of German innovating firms that contains informa-
tion on formal and informal innovation cooperation between customers
and suppliers, we state that firms perceive informal cooperation as being
more important than formal cooperation modes. We then investigate the
determinants of firms’ decisions to engage into the respective coopera-
tion modes. In line with previous empirical work, we do not find much
empirical evidence for the relevance of incoming spillovers. In addition,
our results suggest that this finding holds as well for informal cooper-
ations. A firm’s ability to protect its proprietary innovations, however,
seems to be a key determinant of formal as well as informal coopera-
tions. Furthermore absorptive capacity and the organizational structure
of in-house R&D play an important role. Another relevant driver of verti-
cal cooperations are the innovation dynamics at the industry level. Firms
who operate an R&D department and firms who are involved in costly
R&D projects tend to cooperate formally rather than informally.
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1 Introduction
Research partnerships between innovating firms have attracted great politi-
cal and academic attention during the past decade. Investigating this phe-
nomenon, the focus of interest in the theoretical as well as in the empirical
literature has generally been on formal arrangements of R&D cooperation such
as research joint ventures (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Kaiser, 2002;
Tether, 2002, Miotti and Sachwald, 2003).1
However, other more informal types of cooperation for innovation, like
informal communication between employees from cooperating firms, might
play an important role in the exchange of technical knowledge. 2 A research
team of one firm, for instance, may ask researchers working in an R&D de-
partment of another firm for technical information or providing themselves
technical information to these researchers. In contrast to formal cooperations,
the informal exchange of technical knowledge does neither imply coordina-
tion of R&D nor legally binding contracts. However, the empirical literature
on the determinants of informal exchange of technical knowledge is scarce. 3
Our sample of 730 innovating German firms (which is presented in detail
in section 4) shows that informal cooperation is indeed an important mode of
cooperation for innovation within the supply-chain. While roughly a fourth of
all firms is not engaged in any cooperation, only 3% engage in formal R&D-
cooperation with either supplier or customer, compared to roughly a third
of firms which is engaged in informal cooperation or another third that co-
operates formally and informally at the same time. Figure 1 illustrates these
findings. Hence this suggests that most firms prefer informal cooperative ar-
rangements (concubinage) while only a smaller fraction of firms prefers R&D-
marriage and these latter are typically engaged into informal cooperations as
well. Moreover, the perceived importance to formal cooperation modes is low
as compared to the rating of informal cooperation.4
1In these empirical studies cooperative arrangements are defined as ’active participation of
partners in joint R&D’ which is a paraphrase for formal cooperations (coordination of R&D).
2See Hagedoorn et al. (2000) for a taxanomy of research partnerships.
3A notable exception is the empirical study of Schrader (1991) where the determinants of the
informal exchange of information between firms from the U.S. speciality steel and mini-mill
industry are investigated.
4In the questionnaire, firms have been asked to give not only a quantitative asessment of
their R&D-cooperation modes but also to specify their perception of importance of these co-
operation modes. While roughly 30% of all firms consider informal modes of cooperation as
being of high or very high importance, only 9% or less do so for formal modes of cooperation,
research joint ventures being the least important mode of R&D-cooperation. See Harabi (1998)
for similar observations.
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Figure 1: Firms’ Choice of R&D-Cooperation with Customers and Suppliers
The motivation of this paper is to investigate empirically the factors that
influence the probability of firms to engage into formal and/or informal co-
operation for innovation with vertically related firms. To do this we give a
brief survey on the literature on research cooperations in the following sec-
tion. In section 3, we set up the empirical model to be used. Data source and
implementation are described in section 4. Estimation results are presented
and discussed in section 5. Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2 Why should a firm engage into cooperations for inno-
vation?
Firms’ incentives to form cooperations for innovation have been studied by
scholars from different disciplines, like managerial literature, transaction cost
approaches as well as industrial organization literature5. We do not aim to
provide a comprehensive review of these different lines of literature. Instead,
we identify five factors that can be expected to influence firms’ incentives to
engage into (formal and/or informal) cooperation and discuss their respective
relevance on the basis of the existing relevant literature.
Knowledge Spillovers: Theoretical industrial organization literature suggests
that Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) may be an efficient way of dealing with
market failures in the innovation process, e.g. they allow firms to internal-
5See Hagedoorn et al. (2000) for a survey.
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ize knowledge spillovers (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al.,
1992; DeBondt, 1996). According to this literature an increase in the level of
spillovers leads to an increase in a firm’s probability of cooperating formally
with competitors, given that the spillover level is high.6 Similar results are
reported by authors who extended the analysis to R&D cooperations between
customers and suppliers. Atallah (2002) and Inkmann (2001) introduce interindus-
try trade into the model of Steurs (1995) and show that vertically related firms
do also have an incentive to coordinate their R&D.7 Thus, one would expect
that high knowledge spillovers lead to an increase in a firm’s probability of
cooperating formally with virtically related firms.
Existing empirical studies, however, do not provide empirical evidence for
the hypothesis that knowledge spillovers from other firms do have a positive
impact on formal R&D-cooperations between customers and suppliers. Cassi-
man and Veugelers (2002), who have measured spillovers by the relevance of
public information sources (e.g. patent information) report that the estimated
coefficient of their spillover measure is statistically insignificant for vertical co-
operations. Kaiser (2002) used the weighted sum of R&D expenditures of firms
belonging to other industries as a proxy for vertical spillovers and found no
evidence for a positive influence of vertical spillovers on cooperation decision
of firms in the German service sector.
In contrast to formal cooperation, the informal exchange of technical knowl-
edge between cooperation partners does not allow for internalization of spillovers
but generates itself voluntary knowledge spillovers between cooperating firms.
Nevertheless, expected spillovers from cooperation partners may positively
affect a firm’s willingness to share information with its partner. A profit maxi-
mizing firm may choose to provide information to a cooperation partner in the
expectation that it receives valuable information (spillovers) in return which
may increase its profit. Thus, “reciprocity appears to be one of the fundamen-
tal rules governing information sharing”(Schrader, 1991, p. 154). Kultti and
Takalo (1998) have shown that even competitors which can fully protect their
technical knowledge have an incentive to share information if information
sharing is not too asymmetric. Of course, a firm may benefit the more from the
exchange of technical knowledge the more relevant the cooperation partners’
technical knowledge is. The empirical results reported by Schrader (1991) for
firms of the U.S. speciality steel and mini-mill industry confirm the relevance
6Then, the spread between profits from cooperation with competitors and profits from non-
cooperation is increased by an increase in spillovers.
7Steurs (1995) investigated cooperations between firms that belong to perfectly segmented
industries.
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of reciprocity.
However, while reciprocity may be essential for the informal exchange of
technical knowledge between competitors, the incentive to share knowledge
without reciprocation might be much higher in buyer-supplier relationships.
An upstream firm, for instance, may voluntarily create spillovers to customers
– without reciprocation – in order to induce process and product innovations
by the downstream firms which in turn may enhance the demand for the sup-
plier’s intermediate good (Harhoff, 1996). Thus, we would expect that knowl-
edge spillovers from vertically related firms do increase the probability of in-
formal cooperation if firms regard reciprocity as fundamental but have no in-
fluence if vertically related firms provide information without reciprocation.
Appropriability Conditions: While knowledge spillovers can be useful among
cooperation partners they might be considered as unwanted leakage to third
parties. A supplier may fear, for instance, that the customer transfers the tech-
nical knowledge shared by cooperation partners to the supplier’s competitors.
There is some evidence that such concerns exist in practice. Grindley et al.
(1994, p. 744), for example, report that suppliers of semiconductor materials
and equipment (SME) were concerned over sharing information with mem-
bers of SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consor-
tium) because they feared the disclosure of proprietary information to their
competitors. In this case the leakage of technical knowledge may reduce the
firm’s returns drastically because it may allow its competitors to imitate its
innovations immediately, i.e. it increases the returns to ’free-riding’ by non-
partners. Consequently, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, p. 1169) postulate that
cooperating firms try to “maximize the incoming spillovers from partners and
non-partners, while at the same time minimizing spillovers to non-partners.”
Thus, appropriability conditions may have an influence on a firm’s propen-
sity to engage into informal as well as formal cooperation because it is very
likely that knowledge sharing does occur in both modes of cooperation. In
other words, it is not very likely that partners participate actively in joint
R&D (cooperate formally) without sharing (voluntarily or involuntarily) any
of their technical knowledge. The costs of sharing technical knowledge with
vertically related firms - the decrease in a firm’s rent expectation if the coop-
eration partner transfers the knowledge to competitors - are high if a firm’s
ability to protect its proprietary innovations is low and vice versa. Moreover,
this ability may be viewed as a prerequisite for informal information trading
because “proprietary know-how is only a subject for trading if free diffusion
can be prevented” (von Hippel, 1987, p. 295). We therefore expect that appro-
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priability has a positive impact on the probability of cooperating formally as
well as informally.
The results of empirical studies on the relevance of appropriability for for-
mal cooperations are mixed. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) found that firm-
specific protection mechanisms (e.g. secrecy) increase the probability of co-
operating formally with vertically related firms while industry-specific legal
protection mechanisms (e.g. patents) have no impact. In contrast, Herna´n et
al. (2003) used a proxy that measures the effectiveness of patents in industrial
sectors and found that the effect on cooperation is negative and statistically
significant. However, the difference between the results may be explained by
the fact that the cooperations investigated by Herna´n et al. (2003) were mainly
horizontal cooperations between competitors.8
Absorptive Capacity: Another important determinant for formal coopera-
tion is a firm’s engagement in R&D. Many of the theoretical models dealing
with spillovers and R&D cooperation are based on the assumption that exter-
nal knowledge is like ’manna from heaven’.9 In other words, firms may benefit
from spillovers without doing any in-house R&D which is not very plausible.
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1989) firms need an absorptive capacity in
order to assimilate and exploit external knowledge and this capacity is the re-
sult of the firm’s own (in-house) R&D efforts. Thus, it can be expected that
the degree at which spillovers are useful for firms — which in turn may in-
fluence their propensity to engage into cooperations — is determined by their
engagement in R&D.
The result of empirical studies do not provide a conclusive answer to the
question whether absorptive capacity is relevant for cooperations between ver-
tically related firms. Fritsch and Lukas (2001) found that a firm’s R&D inten-
sity has a statistically significant impact on the firm’s decision to cooperate
with customers and suppliers. The results reported by Tether (2002) for a sam-
ple of firms from UK suggest that a firm’s engagement in R&D has a positive
effect on the probability of cooperating formally with customers and suppli-
ers. In particular, continuous R&D positively effects cooperations with cus-
tomers but not those with suppliers while continuous R&D combined with
high R&D intensity has a positive impact on cooperation with suppliers but
not on those with customers. However, using R&D intensity as an explanatory
variable may produce endogeneity problems since theoretical models predict
8A negative sign indicates that firms in industries with effective protection do not need to
cooperate formally with their competitors in order to internalize spillovers.
9A notable exception is the study of Kamien and Zang (2000).
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that coordination of R&D does affect firms’ R&D efforts and empirical stud-
ies provide evidence for this hypothesis (Kaiser, 2002; Colombo and Garrone,
1996). In contrast, Miotti and Sachwald (2003) and Cassiman and Veugelers
(2002) report for firms from France and Belgium that permanent R&D does
not influence the firms’ propensity to cooperate formally with vertically re-
lated firms. Herna´n et al. (2003) using firm size to proxy absorptive capacity
find for a sample of European firms indeed empirical evidence in favor of this
argument. However, a firm’s absorptive capacity can be expected to be a func-
tion of its R&D activities rather than of the mere size.
Organizational Structure of R&D: Furthermore, we argue that more quali-
tative aspects of a firm’s R&D activities such as the organizational structure of
R&D within a firm may determine its ability to engage into formal cooper-
ation. A high degree of organizational effort may be needed for instance to
manage formal cooperations, like RJV’s, joint development teams or formal
R&D cooperation. Running formal cooperations requires qualified personnel
and produces overhead costs. Legally binding contracts have to be written
and enforced or some researchers have to be assigned to long term joint R&D
projects. One indicator for a high degree of organizational structure of R&D
within a firm is the existence of a R&D department.
In contrast, the informal exchange of technical knowledge is less resource
demanding. Von Hippel (1987, p. 300) postulates that the informal exchange
of technical knowledge can be seen as an inexpensive and flexible form of co-
operation which is a very effective form of cooperation if some of the partners
do already have the know-how and when technical knowledge has a value be-
cause firms can keep it secret. Firms which perform R&D continuously produce
permanently new knowledge which can be exchanged with vertically related
firms whereas it is not very likely that firms conducting R&D on an occasional
basis can do this.
Thus, we expect that the existence of a R&D department has a positive im-
pact on firms’ probability of cooperating formally while firms without such a
department but permanent R&D may have a higher probability of cooperating
informally.
Innovation Dynamics in Industries: Firms that belong to industries where
innovation is characterized by the development of new products and markets
rather than in the amelioration of existing ones may have a higher probabil-
ity of cooperating because the development of new products may require co-
operation with customers and suppliers. Suppliers that cooperate with their
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customers may do so, for instance, in order to reduce the risk associated with
bringing a new product to the market (Tether, 2002, p. 951). Customers devel-
oping novel and very complex innovations may use research joint ventures,
joint development teams or formal R&D cooperations as a mean to coach their
suppliers and to make sure that the supplied intermediate good or the sup-
plied equipment meets the needs of the production of the new products. In a
similar way the informal exchange of technical knowledge may be very help-
ful in very innovative environments. Therefore we expect that innovation dy-
namics in an industry is a relevant driver of formal and informal cooperative
arrangements for innovation.
To sum up , so far, we have identified five main classes of variables that can
be expected to have an influence on firms’ propensity to engage into vertical
R&D cooperation: spillovers, appropriability, absorptive capacity, organizational
structure of R&D and industries’ innovation dynamics. However, the list is prob-
ably larger: Vertically related firms may cooperate in order to share innovation
costs of large scale R&D projects (Banerjee and Lin, 2001) or to share the risks
of innovation. Another motive of engaging into cooperation is to gain access
to complementary knowledge. The availability of technical know-how within
a firm may increase its attractiveness as a cooperation partner, hence a high
complementarity of knowledge might increase the propensity to cooperate with
that partner.
3 Empirical Model
Innovating firms which decide about cooperation with suppliers (customers)
may choose to cooperate formally and/or informally or may choose not to co-
operate at all. Hence, they may choose between four cooperation strategies.
Profit maximizing firms choose their cooperation strategy according to its rel-
ative profit with respect to other cooperation strategies. A firm i will opt to
choose strategy j if the expected profit of this strategy (denoted pii j) is the
maximum among the strategies.
pii j = Max(pii0, pii1, pii2, pii3) (1)
The profit associated with each of these strategies is assumed to be determined
by firm- and industry-specific factors x,
pii j = xi jβ+ ui j, i = 1, ..., N j = 0, ..., 3. (2)
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where β is a parameter vector, ui j is an error term and i denotes the firm. The
profit associated with each cooperation strategy is an unobservable latent vari-
able. What can be observed, however, are the firms’ choices of cooperation
strategies. If strategy j is chosen, we assume that this strategy is the most prof-
itable strategy (Prob(pii j > piik) for all other k "= j).
We assume that firms consider all four cooperation strategies simultane-
ously, which is a basic assumption of the multinomial logit (MNL) model and
therefore justifies the use of this approach. Here, the non-cooperation strategy
is treated in the same way as any other cooperation strategy. Alternatively, it
would be possible to specify the cooperation decision as a sequential process
where firms decide whether they cooperate or not at the first stage and decide
about the mode of cooperation at second stage. However, a sequential process
would imply that the profits of cooperation strategies at the second stage do
not influence cooperation decision of the first stage which does not seem to be
realistic. Hence, the MNL model seems to be the appropriate model.
Another basic assumption of the MNL model is that irrelevant alternatives
are stochastically independent from each other (IIA-assumption), i.e. the odds
ratios of any two cooperation strategies are independent of the probabilities of
other cooperation strategies. Intuitively, the IIA assumption is not very plausi-
ble if firms view two strategies as similar rather than independent. Therefore,
we tested for the validity of this assumption, test results are given in the ap-
pendix.
Assume that the J disturbances of equation (2) are independent and identi-
cally distributed with type I extreme distribution. Then, the multinomial logit
model of cooperation choice can be written as follows (Greene, 2003, pp.719-
723)
Prob(Yi = j | xi) = e
β
′
jxi
1 + ∑3k=1 e
β
′
kxi
for j = 0, ..., 3, β0 = 0. (3)
where the variable Yi indicates a firm’s choice of cooperation mode and one of
the coefficient vectors is normalized to zero in order to achieve identification.
The multinomial logit model implies that the log ratio of the probabilities for
any two cooperation strategies j and k is given by
ln
[Pi j
Pik
]
= x
′
i(β j −βk) = x
′
iβ j with βk = 0. (4)
This means that the estimates of β j reflect the marginal effect of a change in an
explanatory variable xi on the log-odds ratio of the cooperation strategy j and
the baseline strategy k. Note, that sign and magnitude of this coefficient are not
necessarily identical with the marginal effect of a change in xi on probability
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Pi j. The latter can be calculated as follows
∂Pj
∂xi
= Pj
[
β j −
3
∑
k=0
Pkβk
]
= Pj
[
β j −β
]
. (5)
Estimates of the marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables on log-
odds ratios as well as on probabilities of individual cooperation strategies will
be presented in section 5. Let us now present the data on which our analysis is
based.
4 Data
The data-set used in this paper is based on the first and the second wave of
the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) in 1993 and 1994. The first wave was
part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Commission.
This data was collected by the Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung
(ZEW) and the Institut fu¨r angewandte Sozialforschung (infas). We make use of
both samples because the questionnaires contain different areas of information
which are needed to test the hypotheses of the following section. The question-
naire of the second wave contains questions related to different modes of coop-
eration for innovation while the questionnaire of the first wave contains infor-
mation on apropriability conditions, relevance of external knowledge sources
as well as obstacles to innovation.
The original samples consist of 2860 (first wave) and 3065 (second wave)
firms. However, the question concerning the different modes of cooperation
had not been answered by firms which had not introduced product/process
innovations or had not conducted activities to develop such innovations dur-
ing the period from 1991 to 1993. Thus, our study is restricted to the innovating
firms. Moreover, we have merged both samples at the cost of a reduction of the
number of observations. Due to missings the number is further reduced to 730
firms.
Formal and informal cooperation: In the second wave of the MIP, coopera-
tion between customers and suppliers were at the center of interest. Therefore
the questionnaire does not provide information about cooperations with com-
petitors, for instance. The surveyed firms were asked the following question
separately for cooperations with customers and suppliers: “Cooperation with
customers (suppliers) might have a special importance for your innovative
activities. Which of the following modes of cooperation with customers (sup-
pliers) have you had in your firm/line of business in the years 1991-1993.”
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Possible answers were: “joint ventures, joint development teams, formal R&D
cooperation, R&D orders and informal exchange of technical knowledge.”
Joint ventures, joint development teams and formal R&D cooperation are
formal modes of cooperation since firms R&D activities are coordinated and
they are typically based on contractual agreements. R&D orders are, in a strict
sense, market transactions rather than cooperations and we therefore exclude
them from the further analysis. Although not reported here, we have exam-
ined whether the four remaining modes of cooperation are related to each
other. Our results suggest, that these modes of cooperation can be reduced
to two subgroups: formal and informal modes of cooperation. The same result
is reported by Harabi (1998). In the further empirical analysis the variable re-
flecting informal cooperation with customers (suppliers) takes a value of 1 when
firms reported that they had informal exchange of technical knowledge with
their customers (suppliers) and 0 otherwise. The variable reflecting formal co-
operations with customers (suppliers) takes a value of 1 when firms reported
that they had joint ventures and/or joint development teams and/or formal
R&D cooperation with their customers (suppliers) and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 shows the share of firms in the total number of cooperating firms
classified according to different modes of vertical R&D-cooperation as well as
different cooperation partners. We have computed the shares for the total sam-
ple (second wave) as well as for our merged sample. As can be seen from the
upper half of the table, a minority of all cooperating firms (less than 10%) is
engaged into formal R&D-cooperation alone, while roughly 40% (50%) choose
to cooperate purely informally with customers (suppliers). The other cooperat-
ing firms engage in both, formal as well as informal cooperation. Thus, 90% of
the cooperating firms have informal cooperations.
The lower half the table 1 reports on the shares of cooperations with cus-
tomers and suppliers for formal and informal cooperations separately. As can
be seen, 90 percent of the firms are engaged into an exchange of technical
knowledge with both, customers as well as suppliers. The picture is somewhat
different, however, for formal R&D cooperations. Here, 26% of the firms co-
operate exclusively with customers and 15% exclusively with suppliers while
merely 59 percent of the firms having formal cooperation with both, customers
and suppliers.
Note, that the shares presented in table 1 are very similar for the total sam-
ple and our merged data-set. This suggests that our data-set represents the dis-
tribution of cooperating firms’ choice of cooperation modes and cooperation
partners quite well. Indeed, a χ2-test confirms that the shares in the sample do
not differ significantly (atα = 0.01) from those in the complete data-set.
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Table 1: Shares of firms with certain cooperation mode in total cooperations
Customers Customers Suppliers Suppliers
(total) (sample) (total) (sample)
Formal 8.2% 4.8% 6.2% 4.2%
Informal 43.7% 42.6% 52.2% 50.5%
Both 48.1% 52.6% 41.6% 45.3%
Formal Formal Informal Informal
(total) (sample) (total) (sample)
Customers 26.1% 26.1% 4.1% 3.0%
Suppliers 15.6% 15.1% 5.6% 4.5%
Both 58.3% 58.8% 90.3% 92.5%
Note: The number of cooperating firms in our sample is 730 while the number of firms in the total sample
(second wave) is 3065.
Knowledge spillovers: The first spillover measure used in this study is a
measure proposed by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). The firm-specific mea-
sure of incoming spillovers is based on the beliefs of the firm’s management
about the importance of publicly available information for the firm’s innova-
tion process: patent information, specialist conferences and journals. This mea-
sure avoids the difficulties of constructing spillover measures by “jointly mea-
suring the extent of the pool of relevant knowledge and its productivity for the
firm’s innovation process” (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002, p. 1171).10 How-
ever, the spillover measure proposed by Cassiman and Veugelers may capture
spillovers from public information sources but it is not a specific indicator for
the spillovers between customers and suppliers. It may reflect spillovers from
competitors, vertically related firms, other firms, universities as well as public
research institutes. Hence, we call it the generic spillover measure.
We introduce additional spillover measures which we call specific spillover
measures because they reflect the knowledge flows from customers and sup-
pliers. These measures are based on the beliefs of the firm’s management about
the importance of customers and suppliers as information sources for the firm’s
innovation process. In the questionnaire firms rated the importance of (1) cus-
tomers, (2) suppliers of intermediate inputs and (3) suppliers of equipment on
a 5-point scale. We have computed the relevance of suppliers by summing the
scores of answers to questions (2) and (3). We acknowledge that these mea-
sures may not only capture voluntary and involuntary spillovers from cus-
10Alternatively, other firms’ R&D capital stocks may be used as spillover measures. However,
such measures require the calculation of firm-(industry-) specific R&D capital stocks and the
computation of weights to aggregate them. See Griliches (1992).
11
tomers (suppliers) but may also reflect knowledge flows that arise from mar-
ket transactions, like R&D orders or licensing. The score of each indicator is
re-scaled to a number between 0 and 1. We apply this form of re-scaling to all
variables which are based on qualitative answers.
Appropriability: Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) we use two mea-
sures to capture appropriability conditions, one is firm- the other is industry-
specific. In the first wave of the MIP firms rated the effectiveness of protection
mechanisms separately for product and process innovations on a 5-point scale.
Appropriability conditions are represented by two groups of mechanisms. The
first group are legal protection mechanisms: (1) patents, brand names and copy-
right. The second group are strategic protection mechanisms: secrecy, complex-
ity and lead time in commercialization. The answers have been aggregated
to variables appropriability and legal protection. Legal protection enters the esti-
mation as an industry-level variable (2-digit NACE). because it is likely that
this protection mechanism is industry- rather than firm-specific. Firm-specific
appropriability is measured by strategic protection mechanisms.
Absorptive capacity and organizational structure of R&D: We use two vari-
ables to describe absorptive capacity and the organizational structure of firms’
R&D: One that indicates whether a firm performs R&D continuously and one
that indicates the existence of an R&D-department, both being coded as binary
variables. These variables continuous R&D and existence of R&D Department are
not identical. While all firms in our data-set with a R&D department perform
R&D continuously, more than one third of firms that perform R&D continu-
ously do so without a R&D department.
Innovation dynamics on industry level: In the questionnaire of second wave
of the MIP firms have estimated the share of various categories of innovation
expenditures in total innovation expenditures. Two categories were expendi-
tures for a) test production, pilot projects, product design (not R&D) and b)
market tests and market development costs (without cost for establishing a
sales network). The sum of both shares reflects the intensity of development of
new products and new markets. We take the mean of this measure by industry
level (2-digit NACE) as a proxy for innovation dynamics in an industry.
Innovation cost, innovation risk and complementarities: In the first wave
of the MIP one area of information concerned the factors hampering innova-
tion. Firms rated the relevance of various factors hampering their innovative
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activities on a 5-point scale. Out of 13 possible answers we have chosen two
for the construction of an indicator variable of innovation risk: a) innovation
risk too high and b) difficulties in controlling innovation costs. To construct an
indicator for innovation costs we used the following answers: c) low return to
innovation expenditures because of high costs of the innovation and d) low
return to innovation expenditures because of lasting amortization duration. In
order to construct an indicator variable for complementarities we used the an-
swer: e) lack of technological information. The measure of complementarities is
1 minus the re-scaled score of this answer.
Firm specific characteristics: Other firm-specific control variables are firm
size, measured as the logarithm of the number of employees and a dummy
that takes the value one if a firm is located in Eastern Germany and 0 other-
wise. The first one controls for effects of firm size which in previous studies
have found to be relevant for cooperation (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002,
Herna´n et al., 2003, Kaiser, 2002). The second accounts for idiosyncratic shocks
that occurred through the transition process in Eastern Germany at the time of
observation. 11
5 Results
In this section we will present the marginal effects of changes in explanatory
variables on log-odds ratios and on probabilities of individual cooperation
strategies (see equations 4 and 5) obtained from separate estimations of the
MNL model for cooperations with customers and suppliers.
However, let us first discuss potential endogeneity problems that may oc-
cur in the estimation process. Above, we have argued that specific spillovers
from vertically related firms may influence the firms’ decision to cooperate.
However, a reverse effect of formal and informal cooperations on incoming
spillovers may also exist since firms may form informal and formal cooper-
ations in order to increase incoming knowledge flows. Thus, firms may rate
customers or suppliers as important external sources of information because
formal and/or informal cooperations are important channels for the transfer
of knowledge between vertically related firms. The data used in this study
11In the second wave of the MIP firms reported on their vertical cooperations during the
years from 1991 to 1993. At that time, a transformation process took place in Eastern Europe
and research and cooperations networks in Eastern Germany changed drastically or vanished.
Therefore, firms located in Eastern Germany can be expected to have a lower propensity to
cooperate formally and informally.
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do not contain information about the degree of voluntary knowledge sharing.
The only information we have is that there is voluntary knowledge sharing in
informal cooperations but we can not say whether it occurs in formal cooper-
ations. However, it is very likely that our measures of specific spillovers are
endogenous with respect to cooperation. Therefore, we follow Cassiman and
Veugelers (2002) and make use of a two step estimation procedure. The first
step is the regression of the endogenous variables on instrument variables.
The latter are those variables which are exogenous by assumption. The sec-
ond step is the estimation of the MNL model using the predicted values of the
potentially endogenous variables as explanatory variables.12
First, we have estimated the MNL model with the four categories ‘no co-
operation’, ‘informal cooperation’, ‘formal cooperation’ and ‘both modes of
cooperation’. However, a Wald test of whether the latter two categories ‘for-
mal cooperation’ and ‘both modes of cooperation’ can be combined suggest
that this is the case. Thus, we have proceeded with the remaining three choice
categories. Further Wald test reject the Null hypothesis that these categories
can be further collapsed indicating that significant differences between these
cooperation strategies exist.13 Thus, we will analyze three cooperation strate-
gies, namely ‘no cooperation’, ‘informal cooperation’, ‘both modes of cooper-
ation/formal cooperation’.
Next, we have tested the validity of the IIA assumption since it is essential
for the appropriateness of the MNL model. We have employed a Hausman-
type test provided by Hausman and McFadden (1984) which compares the
estimated coefficients of a model using all three categories and a subset where
one of the categories is excluded. If the IIA assumption holds, then the es-
timation of the restricted and the unrestricted model should provide similar
estimates. The test results suggest that the null hypothesis of IIA cannot be re-
jected for cooperation with customers (see table 6 in the appendix). The same
is true for cooperation with suppliers if the category ‘both modes of cooper-
ation’ is excluded while the χ2-statistic is negative when the ‘informal coop-
eration’ category is excluded. Furthermore, we have performed an alternative
test which has been proposed by Small and Hsiao (1985). The results of this
test confirm that the IIA assumption is not violated.
12In contrast to Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) we do not treat generic spillovers, appropri-
ability and continuous R&D as endogenous variables. It is unlikely, for example, that the effect
of cooperation is strong enough to let firms switch from occasional to continuous R&D. Never-
theless, we have performed second stage regressions for these variables but we have not found
any evidence for endogeneity. To save space we will not report the results.
13See table 5 in the appendix.
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Table 2: Results of a multinomial logit estimation of the probaility of two classes of cooperation with
customers and suppliers aginst no cooperation
Cooperation with Customers Suppliers
Cooperation mode (1) (2) (1) (2)
Incoming Spillovers (generic) -0.490 0.322 -0.302 0.065
(0.384) (0.576) (0.590) (0.913)
Incoming Spillovers* (specific) 0.623 3.813 5.325 0.486
(0.714) (0.083) (0.111) (0.895)
Appropriability 0.992 1.488 1.228 2.072
(0.032) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000)
Legal Protection on Industry Level 0.023 -1.453 -0.514 -0.340
(0.993) (0.568) (0.839) (0.900)
Existence of R&D-Dept. (0/1) 0.276 1.057 0.446 1.163
(0.380) (0.001) (0.156) (0.000)
Continuous R&D (0/1) 0.625 0.555 1.019 0.543
(0.016) (0.046) (0.001) (0.123)
Cost of R&D -0.130 0.737 -0.674 0.803
(0.784) (0.158) (0.189) (0.157)
Risk of R&D 0.167 -0.326 -0.172 -0.401
(0.739) (0.535) (0.802) (0.593)
Complementarities -0.315 0.179 0.220 -0.024
(0.456) (0.684) (0.600) (0.958)
Innovation Dynamics on Industry Level 12.305 12.952 13.696 13.211
(0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
Firm Size 0.134 0.217 0.147 0.283
(0.065) (0.003) (0.044) (0.000)
Firm is located in Eastern Germany (0/1) 0.532 -0.117 0.260 -0.455
(0.026) (0.652) (0.432) (0.225)
Constant -3.381 -7.246 -6.417 -5.304
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Number of Observations 730 730
χ2(24) 222.64 241.18
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.1414 0.1523
Cooperation modes: (1) informal cooperation; (2) formal cooperation and mixed cooperation modes.
∗Variable Specific Incoming Spillovers results from an instrument variable estimation.
Values in brackets show probabilites of variables not to differ stochastically from zero (p-values).
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Estimation Results. The estimated coefficients presented in table 2 reflect the
marginal effect of a change in the respective explanatory variable on the log-
odds ratios (see equation 4). Since we have chosen the category ‘no coopera-
tion’ as the baseline category, a positive and statistically significant estimate
of a coefficient implies that an increase in the respective variable leads to an
increase in probability of cooperating relative to the probability of not coop-
erating. The first and the second column of the table contain the results for
the ‘informal cooperation’ and the ‘both modes of cooperation’ categories of
cooperations with customers. Columns three and four contain the results for
cooperations with suppliers. According to the results of a likelihood ratio test,
the hypothesis that the estimated slope coefficients of all explanatory variables
are jointly zero can be safely rejected.
The estimated coefficients of the generic spillover measure are statistically
insignificant for each category and they are jointly insignificant (see table 4 in
the appendix for tests of joint insignificance). We find, however, some empir-
ical evidence for a positive effect of specific spillovers on formal cooperation
with customers. The estimated coefficient of this spillover measure is posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 10% level for the category ‘both modes
of cooperations’. The estimated coefficients of the appropriability measure are
positive and highly significant whereas the estimated coefficients of the legal
protection mechanisms measure are statistically insignificant. According to our
estimation results the coefficients of four other variables, namely continuous
R&D, R&D department, firm size and innovation dynamics at the industry
level are positive and statistically significant indicating a positive impact on
the log-odds ratios. The results of separate Wald test for each of these vari-
ables which are presented in table 4 in the appendix confirm this.
The log-odds ratio of any two categories may increase because the nomina-
tor (Pj) increases or the denominator (Pk) decreases. Hence, the marginal effects
of the explanatory variables on the probabilities of each cooperation strategy
are more straightforward to interpret (see equation (5)). Therefore, we com-
pute these marginal effects. Results are reported in table 3.
The results suggest that the probability of choosing the ‘no cooperation’
strategy is not influenced by incoming spillovers. Neither is the marginal ef-
fect of the generic spillover measure statistically significant nor is the marginal
effect of specific spillover measure. It is, however, significantly reduced by an
increase in a firm’s appropriability. Thus, a high effectiveness of strategic pro-
tection increases the probability of cooperating with customers and suppliers.
Moreover, the variables continuous R&D, R&D department,firm size and in-
novation dynamics in industries have a negative and statistically significant
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Table 3: Results of two multinomial logit estimations of the probability of two classes of cooperation with
customers and suppliers against no cooperation: marginal effects
Cooperation with Customers Suppliers
Cooperation Type (0) (1) (2) (0) (1) (2)
Estimated at probability 0.215 0.424 0.360 0.227 0.355 0.418
Incoming Spillovers (generic) 0.0225 -0.0837 0.0612 0.0089 -0.1600 0.1511
(0.798) (0.434) (0.569) (0.921) (0.119) (0.177)
Incoming Spillovers* (specific) -0.5242 1.2264 -0.7022 -0.4120 -0.4230 0.8350
(0.318) (0.068) (0.313) (0.160) (0.288) (0.098)
Appropriability -0.2729 -0.0169 0.2898 -0.2212 0.0063 0.2149
(0.000) (0.859) (0.004) (0.003) (0.944) (0.033)
Legal Protection on Industry Level 0.0733 -0.0737 0.0003 0.1360 0.2208 -0.3567
(0.855) (0.874) (0.999) (0.734) (0.613) (0.454)
Existence of R&D-Dept. (0/1) -0.1259 -0.0748 0.2007 -0.1189 -0.0961 0.2150
(0.004) (0.149) (0.000) (0.008) (0.050) (0.000)
Continuous R&D (0/1) -0.1411 0.1641 -0.0230 -0.1072 0.0622 0.0451
(0.011) (0.007) (0.734) (0.028) (0.208) (0.425)
Cost of R&D -0.0007 -0.2874 0.2882 -0.0594 -0.1390 0.1985
(0.993) (0.004) (0.006) (0.439) (0.135) (0.065)
Risk of R&D 0.0468 0.0193 -0.0661 0.0175 0.0866 -0.1041
(0.665) (0.887) (0.634) (0.828) (0.360) (0.319)
Complementarities -0.0183 0.0574 -0.0391 0.0085 -0.0986 0.0902
(0.781) (0.481) (0.633) (0.901) (0.204) (0.293)
Innovation Dynamics on Industry Level -2.2761 1.3253 0.9508 -2.2215 0.8968 1.3246
(0.002) (0.115) (0.247) (0.004) (0.264) (0.128)
Firm Size -0.0353 -0.0073 0.0427 -0.0315 -0.0015 0.0330
(0.002) (0.574) (0.001) (0.006) (0.906) (0.017)
Firm is located in Eastern Germany (0/1) 0.0074 0.1317 -0.1391 -0.0345 0.1425 -0.1080
(0.888) (0.047) (0.028) (0.346) (0.007) (0.033)
Notes: Cooperation Types: (0) no cooperation; (1) informal cooperation; (2) formal cooperation and mixed
cooperation modes.
∗Variable Specific Incoming Spillovers results from an instrument variable estimation.
Values in brackets show probabilites of variables not to differ stochastically from zero (p-values).
For binary coded variables, the result expresses the impact of a discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1
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impact on the probability of choosing the ‘no cooperation’ strategy.
The probability of choosing the ‘informal cooperation’ strategy is not af-
fected by a marginal increase in generic spillovers but there is weak empiri-
cal evidence that an increase in specific spillovers from customers has a posi-
tive impact on a firm’s probability of cooperating informally with customers.
A marginal increase in a firm’s appropriability does not have a statistically
significant impact on the decision to cooperate informally alone. Continuous
R&D has a positive influence on informal cooperation with customers whereas
the existence of a R&D department and costs of R&D have a negative effect.
Furthermore, firms which are located in Eastern Germany have a higher prob-
ability of cooperating informally.
Next, we turn to a firm’s probability of choosing the ‘both modes of co-
operation’ strategy. Again generic spillover do not have a significant impact
whereas the marginal effect of (specific) spillovers from customers is weakly
significant. The marginal effect of appropriability is positive and statistically
significant for cooperations with suppliers as well as for cooperations with
customers. Firms with a R&D department have a higher probability of co-
operating formally with customer and suppliers. Moreover, costs of innova-
tion have a positive and statistically significant marginal impact on a firm’s
decision to cooperate formally with customers and suppliers. Innovation risk
and complementarities are statistically insignificant indicating that risk shar-
ing and the availability of know-how within in a firm are not relevant drivers
of formal and informal cooperations with vertically related firms. Firms in
Eastern Germany have a lower probability of cooperating formally.
Discussion of Estimation Results. Our results provide only weak empiri-
cal evidence for a positive effect of spillovers from vertically related firms on
formal cooperation (R&D coordination) as suggested by the theoretical liter-
ature. There is some evidence that a firm’s probability of choosing the ‘both
modes of cooperation’ strategy with customers as well as a firm’s willingness
to share its technical knowledge with suppliers are affected by the relevance of
these firms as external knowledge sources. The latter result would hint on the
relevance of reciprocity for knowledge sharing. However, the statistical signif-
icance of the estimated effects of our specific spillover measure is rather weak
and we have not found positive effects of specific spillovers on informal co-
operations with customers and formal cooperations with suppliers. Although
not reported here, we have performed estimations using various econometric
specifications and the results suggest that the statistical significance of the es-
timated effect of the specific spillover measures is very sensitive. Moreover,
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our results show that the influence of the generic spillover measure is statis-
tically insignificant which is in line with the finding reported by Cassiman
and Veugelers (2002). Taken together, empirical results do not provide much
empirical evidence for a positive impact of incoming spillovers on firms’ co-
operations with vertically related firms.
This result might explain why many firms in our sample choose to coop-
erate only informally (hence not formally) with their customers and suppliers,
i.e. firms share their technical knowledge without coordinating their R&D.
From a theoretical point of view this would not be rational because formal
cooperation (coordination of R&D) allows cooperation partners to internalize
these voluntary spillovers. Consequently, profits of the ‘formal and informal
cooperations strategy’ would exceed profits of ‘informal cooperation strategy’.
14 However, internalization of spillovers does not seem to be the relevant rea-
son for formal cooperations between customers and suppliers.
Appropriability seems to be a very relevant determinant for cooperation
with vertically related firms. If a firm can effectively protect the rents from its
product and process innovations through secrecy, complexity and lead time, it
is significantly more likely that this firm is engaged into cooperative arrange-
ments with its customers and suppliers. In particular, the probability of coop-
erating in both modes of cooperation is increased. There may be two explana-
tions for this result: Firstly, cooperating firms do not fear that their technical
knowledge leaks out to competitors because they are able to avoid the invol-
untary leakage of knowledge to non-partners. Secondly, cooperating firms are
technology leaders in their market and produce complex products. Then, these
firms may not have to fear that leakage of knowledge leads to an immediate
imitation of their innovations by their competitors and in turn to an erosion
of their profits. Cassiman et al. (2002) show that a leading technological firm
has an incentive to make strategic investments to increase the complexity of
the product or process design since this reduces the danger of imitation. In
both cases, a high degree of effectiveness of strategic protection is something
like a prerequisite for vertical cooperations. This means that ‘strong’ partners
cooperate formally and informally while ‘weak’ ones do not. In contrast, legal
protection (patents, copy-rights and brand names) does not seem to be rel-
evant indicating that better appropriability conditions due to more effective
legal protection of product and process innovations do not influence a firm’s
decision to cooperate formally or informally.
14Informal cooperations between customers and suppliers are not explicitly discussed by
Atallah(2002) and Inkmann(2001) but profits of coordination of R&D increase with vertical
spillovers. The latter is equivalent to an increase in the transfer of technical knowledge.
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The firms’ engagement in R&D has an impact on cooperative behavior. Firms
that perform R&D continuously have a higher probability of cooperating with
vertically related firms. This results may reflect the relevance of absorptive ca-
pacity for cooperation. Furthermore, our results show that the organizational
structure of R&D seems to affect the choice of cooperation mode. Firms con-
ducting R&D continuously have a higher probability of cooperating infor-
mally whereas the existence of a R&D department has no or a negative impact
on the decision to cooperate informally. The results for formal cooperation are
just the opposite. Here, the existence of a R&D department has a positive and
highly significant effect whereas continuous R&D is statistically insignificant,
once controlled for the existence of a R&D department. Firms with own R&D
departments seem to have the organizational structure of R&D which allows
them to manage formal cooperation while others may not. This result suggests
that formal cooperations are characterized by large overhead costs and there-
fore formal cooperation (R&D coordination) may be associated with higher
costs than informal cooperation (knowledge sharing). This interpretation is
supported by our finding that firm size has a significant impact on a firm’s de-
cision to cooperate formally whereas the probability of cooperating informally
is not affected by firm size.15
Innovation dynamics in an industry seem to be a relevant driver of coopera-
tive arrangements for innovation since a high share of innovation expenditures
for the development of new products and markets at the industry level leads
to an increase in a firm’s probability of cooperating formally and informally
with customers and suppliers. This result may indicate that vertically related
firms exchange their technical knowledge in order to reduce the risks associ-
ated with bringing a new product to the market or the implementation of new
production technologies.
Furthermore, our results suggest that innovation costs have a positive im-
pact on a firm’s decision to cooperate formally with customers and suppliers
while this is not the case for purely informal cooperations with vertically re-
lated firms. One might expect this since the informal exchange of technical
knowledge is not designed to share costs. Thus, agreements to perform co-
operative R&D (formal cooperation) seem to be preferred if customers and
suppliers do not have an incentive to perform R&D independently (von Hip-
pel, 1987; p. 300). Such incentives may not exist because innovation costs are
too high. Then, customers and suppliers may be engaged in formal coopera-
tions in order to share innovation costs of large scale R&D projects, e.g. costs for
15Note, that the logarithm of employees is used as an indicator for firm size. A positive coef-
ficient implies a nonlinear, concave, relationship.
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laboratories, scientific instruments or office space.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the determinants of cooperative arrangements for in-
novation between vertically related firms. Our estimation results suggest that
appropriability, absorptive capacity, organizational structure of R&D and in-
dustries’ innovation dynamics are relevant determinants of a firm’s decision
to cooperate.
Appropriability seems to be a key determinant for formal and informal
cooperations with vertically related firms. A firm’s ability to protect its pro-
prietary innovations by protection mechanisms (appropriability), like secrecy,
complexity and lead time, tends to increase the probability of cooperating with
vertically related firms. In contrast, our estimation results do not provide much
empirical evidence in support to the hypothesis that (incoming) spillovers be-
tween vertically related firms do have a positive impact on a firm’s decision
to cooperate. This extends the findings of previous work to informal coopera-
tion. Moreover, we find that firms in industries with an intense development
of new products and new markets (innovation dynamics) have a higher prob-
ability of cooperating formally and informally with customers and suppliers.
Furthermore, firms’ continuous engagement in R&D, which may reflect absorp-
tive capacity, seem to be relevant for cooperation.
Our results suggest that costs of cooperation may explain why the number
of formal cooperations is considerably lower than the number of informal co-
operations. Formal cooperative arrangements, like research joint ventures, are
much more resource demanding than informal cooperations. Costs associated
with formal modes of cooperation may work as a threshold for firms which
are willing to engage in formal cooperations. Especially large firms engaged
in large scale R&D projects which have own R&D departments are more likely
to choose a mode of formal cooperation with vertically related firms. In con-
trast, informal cooperation allows for a flexible transfer of specific and com-
mercially sensitive information, e.g. information about new product design,
new production processes or market development, without writing and en-
forcing contracts.
Given the lack of theoretical literature on informal cooperations and the prac-
tical relevance of this mode of cooperation fruitful research can be expected
in the future. Theoretical studies could investigate the influence of knowledge
protection on a firm’s decision to cooperate informally. Another interesting
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point is the stability of informal exchange of knowledge. Which factors re-
duce or increase the incentives to defect from informal cooperation? Moreover,
empirical studies on informal cooperations between horizontally related firms
would be an interesting extension.
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A Test results
Table 4: Likelihood Ratio Test: Joint insignificance of coefficients associated with given variables
Customers Suppliers
χ2(2) χ2(2)
Incoming Spillovers (generic) 2.6410 0.6180
( 0.267 ) ( 0.734 )
Incoming Spillovers* (specific) 3.5120 3.4910
( 0.173 ) ( 0.175 )
Appropriability 9.3920 16.1250
( 0.009 ) ( 0.000 )
Legal Protection on Industry Level 0.5650 0.0410
( 0.754 ) ( 0.980 )
Existence of R&D-Dept. (0/1) 16.3970 15.9560
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Continuous R&D (0/1) 6.6610 10.8870
( 0.036 ) ( 0.004 )
Cost of R&D 3.4460 9.4770
( 0.179 ) ( 0.009 )
Risk of R&D 1.1040 0.2930
( 0.576 ) ( 0.864 )
Complementarities 1.6930 0.4980
( 0.429 ) ( 0.779 )
Innovation Dynamics on Industry Level 8.8740 10.2070
( 0.012 ) ( 0.006 )
Firm Size 8.9060 14.8540
( 0.012 ) ( 0.000 )
Firm is located in Eastern Germany (0/1) 9.5160 4.9310
( 0.009 ) ( 0.085 )
Notes: ∗Variable Specific Incoming Spillovers results from an instrument variable estimation.
Values in brackets show probabilites of variables being jointly insignificant (p-values).
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Table 5: Wald-test of the Null that respective categories can be collapsed
Customer
Test χ2(12)
Informal vs. Mixed Mode 66.477
(0.000)
Informal vs. No cooperation 53.189
(0.000)
Mixed Mode vs. No cooperation 127.770
(0.000)
Supplier
Test χ2(12)
Informal vs. Mixed Mode 72.032
(0.000)
Informal vs. No cooperation 74.903
(0.000)
Mixed Mode vs. No cooperation 128.026
(0.000)
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Table 6: Two tests for validity of the IIA assumption
Hausman Test for Customers
Omitted Cooperation Type χ2(13) Evidence
(1) 2.127 for H0
(1.000)
(2) 2.097 for H0
(1.000)
Hausman Test for Suppliers
Omitted Cooperation Type χ2(13) Evidence
(1) -118.090 for H0
(—-)
(2) 5.165 for H0
(0.971)
Small-Hsiao Test for Customers
Omitted Cooperation Type χ2(13) Evidence
(1) 12.492 for H0
(0.488)
(2) 15.722 for H0
(0.264)
Small-Hsiao Test for Suppliers
Omitted Cooperation Type χ2(13) Evidence
(1) 13.109 for H0
(0.439)
(2) 10.097 for H0
(0.686)
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